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Address
NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR.*
I will sketch the background of the law that came into focus
(and widespread attention) in the Penn Central case.' American
zoning law is the largest body of law which is fairly closely on
point; yet American land use law, of course, extends well beyond
that, for police-power restrictions have also been invoked in sub-
division control, the official map, and a few other areas. The to-
tal volume of reported litigation in American land use law has
now (as of 1978) reached approximately 13,000 cases.
We are now in a period of a major transition in American
land use law, and so we are seeing rather striking reversals in
several basic areas of that law. While there was some evidence of
this transition in the late Sixties, the change has been primarily
the product of the Seventies.
American land use regulation has generally operated with-
out compensation-for one simple reason. The first really rele-
vant case, decided in 1899,' involved height limits around Cop-
ley Square in Boston, where the Legislature had authorized
condemnation of air rights above a certain height. The Massa-
chusetts Court upheld the condemnation as a proper exercise of
eminent domain for a public use; taking the air rights was held
to have created something in the nature of an easement, created
by the statute and annexed to the park. However, the court went
on to say that compensation was not necessary. Ever since then,
American zoning has proceeded on the basis of that last sen-
tence: municipalities have not insisted upon paying for what
they could get for free. This is a short summary of the whole
law.
In contemplating this area of the law, everyone's initial re-
action is the same-that there is infinite confusion with few
meaningful guidelines. My own present view is almost precisely
the contrary. In this area of the law there is a fairly structured,
albeit exceedingly complex, system, with its own internal rules
which are usually followed. The outcome in a given situation is
1
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fairly predictable, if you know four things-the type of plaintiff,
the state, the date, and the nature of the land use conflict in-
volved (the latter is clearly the least important of the four). If
you know your way around, and the basic facts of the particular
situation, you can expect to predict the outcome correctly, well,
say, perhaps 80 percent of the time. However, to say that is to
recognize that we are way short of perfection in predictability;
we still have a fairly leaky system.
First, consider the type of plaintiff. Land use law involves a
series of conflicts, in the judicial realm, among three parties in
interest: 1) the developer, who usually wants some more inten-
sive land use; 2) the neighbors, who would almost always like
some less intensive land use than has already been authorized,
and so are likely to be incensed at the thought of any further
relaxation of the existing regulations; and 3) the "third-party
nonbeneficiaries," those who are essentially excluded by the op-
eration of the system, i.e., people who would like to move into a
particular area but cannot do so because housing is too expen-
sive there, in part because of the existing land use regulations.
It was in the 1970s that the third party nonbeneficiaries
have come to the fore in reported law. Before that, each case
could be classified as either a developer's case, where the devel-
oper was challenging a refusal to allow him to develop more in-
tensively, or a neighbors' case, where the neighbors were chal-
lenging a local decision to permit a developer to develop more
intensively. Incidentally, while the former get almost all the at-
tention, there are several important states where the latter are
more common.
Next, consider the date. In this century, American land use
law has gone through four periods, varying primarily in the judi-
cial attitudes toward claims made by developers.
In the first period, covering roughly the first two decades of
the century, the developer's claims were almost always upheld,
and municipal land use regulations struck down.
The second period was characterized by Euclid." The basic
principle of zoning was not upheld: a developer's industrial and
commercial development rights could be taken away by zoning
regulations, without compensation. However, in this period the
situation was usually very different on challenges to the zoning
of a particular tract: the developer usually won." In effect, zoning
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was all very well as long as you didn't use it much.
In the third period, the pendulum swung to the other ex-
treme: the judges decided to turn the towns loose and see if they
could provide a better environment. Under the prevailing "fairly
debatable" test, municipalities usually prevailed over developers
in lawsuits-so long as their lawyers were not struck dumb when
asked to justify the zoning restriction involved. Moreover, while
there was a lot of talk about protecting broader aspects of the
"general welfare," the reference was to the welfare of the indi-
vidual municipality.
The now-developing fourth period is more complex. It rep-
resents essentially a revulsion from the third period-a growing
(and long-overdue) judicial scepticism on what the municipali-
ties have been up to. It was high time for a revival of more ac-
tive judicial review; and zoning restrictions are now widely eval-
uated in their regional context.
Now I am referring to "periods" here in a very special sense,
for the various states have gone from the second to the third
period, and now from the third to the fourth period, at very dif-
ferent rates of speed. New Jersey shifted sharply from the sec-
ond to the third period in 1948 by adopting a new state constitu-
tion and, much more importantly, by appointing a new set of
judges. At the other extreme, Illinois has never made this transi-
tion; the judges there seem happy that they are still in the sec-
ond period, at least so far as their majority rule is concerned,
and wouldn't think of leaving it. (They also have a minority rule,
which is pure third-period.)
Next, consider the state. The variation in zoning and plan-
ning law among the various states has been enormous. In fact,
some 13 states handle about 85 percent of the case law;5 and in
each of these major states, the zoning jurisprudence is quite dis-
tinctive, differing rather sharply from all the others. The other
states fall between the extremes in New Jersey (or California)
and Illinois. The states that (in the third period) went all-out in
upholding zoning regulations were California (above all), New
Jersey, Massachusetts, and Maryland. These have been the
states with the most advanced case law. Several other major
states have tended to fluctuate back and forth-New York, Flor-
ida, Ohio, Michigan, and, above all, Pennsylvania. (No one tries
to predict anything in Pennsylvania.) Rhode Island is close to
1981]
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Illinois.
It must be remembered that American land use law is a
matter of state constitutional law as developed by the state su-
preme courts. From 1928 until it came back into the field in
1974, the United States Supreme Court handled only one land
use case. During those 46 years, the state courts knew what they
were doing, but the United States Supreme Court gave no indi-
cation that it did.
In this (fourth) period of major transition, several clearly
defined currents are running, frequently in conflicting directions.
In several ways the courts have been clearly and consciously
moving to reduce local autonomy-to limit the power of munici-
palities to do what they were doing so successfully in the third
period. The clearest example is the anti-exclusionary litigation,
cluminating in the famous Mount Laurel case in New Jersey,
which I helped to argue.8 A second example has come in the in-
terpretation of the comprehensive planning requirement; a
third, in reviewing the criteria for variance.
In the anti-exclusionary cases, third party nonbeneficiaries
have suddenly been getting a lot of judicial attention. The issues
raised successfully in the 1970s seemed perfectly clear to some of
us in the early 1950s. A lot of others preferred not to think
about it. Suddenly, in 1970, everyone became conscious of the
issue, and the result has been the most striking aspect of land
use law in the 1970s.
The sharp technical difference between the third and fourth
periods can be stated simply. In the third period the courts ex-
tended the local powers to protect the environment not only on
the traditional grounds of health and safety, but also on broader
aspects of the general welfare, and began to define what that
vague term meant. What is then meant was quite clearly the
welfare of the individual municipality. Each municipality could
protect its own general welfare, and the devil take the hind-
most-and he did. In contrast, in the fourth period, general wel-
fare is not a local but a regional matter. If a zoning restriction is
challenged, it must be justified by an affirmative showing that
the regulation contributes to the regional general welfare; if not,
the regulation is invalid. This doctrine thus serves to limit town
powers.
A second area where courts have restricted municipal auton-
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omy involves the relation between zoning and planning. For a
long time, in interpreting the comprehensive-plan doctrine, the
courts essentially read out of zoning laws the requirement that
zoning must be in accordance with the comprehensive plan.
While the courts have usually not overruled those older
cases, judicial interest in the planning background of zoning,
and in whether zoning conforms thereto, has been a major con-
cern in the law of the 1970s. In a number of important cases, the
courts have held zoning regulations invalid because they failed
to conform to an existing comprehensive plan-a complete re-
versal of the previously prevailing policy. 10
A third area where the courts have reduced local autonomy
involves judicial review of variances. Many local zoning boards
had been issuing variances essentially for the asking-and some-
times there was a strong suspicion that money was passed under
the table. Now several major courts have been striking down
variances if these were not accompanied by clear-cut documen-
tation that they were granted in accordance with the criteria
read into the statute by the courts.
The clear common denominator of all three trends is an in-
creasing judicial scepticism about local decisions on land use, ac-
companied by an increasing judicial activism which looks into
what is going on. In these three ways, municipalities have thus
lost power. The courts realized that the municipalities were
abusing their power, so this is a welcome change. Yet, at the
same time, other trends have been pointing in the opposite di-
rection: the courts have been upholding land use regulations
based on environmental and aesthetic concerns, thereby
strengthening the public power over land use. The state courts,
like the federal, have substantially expanded the previously-un-
derstood area of permissible regulation by approving some fairly
extreme environmental restrictions-some, in effect, requiring
land to be kept open.
We can now turn to the special problem of aesthetics and
the police power. A long-developing trend has culminated in in-
creasing judicial respect for aesthetic criteria. The two principal
legal issues in this context are the "taking issue" and the ques-
tion of adequate standards. The "taking issue" is an aspect of
substantive due process-whether an aesthetic regulation is too
extreme a limitation on a developer's property rights and, there-
1981]
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fore, invalid. The question of standards has now become the
more important issue. For the longstanding reluctance of the
courts to give full credence to aesthetics as a basis for police-
power regulation without compensation is not merely obstruc-
tionist; it derives from concern for some quite serious problems,
including the subjective nature of many aesthetic judgments.
If there is to be any sense of certainty in land use adminis-
tration, and any serious attempt to provide equal treatment for
different applicants, it is important to establish standards to de-
fine what is ugly or attractive, acceptable or unacceptable. In
some cases, this is relatively easy: almost everyone would agree
that a junkyard in the midst of a residential area is ugly. That is
not a marginal case with room for reasonable differences of opin-
ion. On the other hand, in looking at the design of a new subdi-
vision of the standard type of tract housing, people may differ as
to whether this is attractive or ugly. The legal question here is
then no longer one of taking; the question is whether the regula-
tions are administrable-whether it is possible to define suffi-
ciently clear-cut criteria so that those who apply the criteria can
give equal treatment to all who come before them, without fear
or favor. That is not an easy matter.
These questions have come up in two major lines of cases,
those concerned with sign regulation and with architectural con-
trol. The latter have usually involved historic districts, where a
distinctive and valuable style of architecture extends over a sub-
stantial area.
A review of history on the specific question of the judicial
attitudes towards aesthetics as a basis of police-power regulation
is in order here, for these have also gone through a series of
three periods, which are roughly analogous to (but by no means
the same as) the four periods of land use generally.
1. The period when aesthetics was not regarded as a legiti-
mate goal.
2. An era of legal fiction.
3. The move toward full recognition, together with the de-
velopment of various intermediate rationales.
In the first of these periods, the prevailing judicial view was
that aesthetics was not considered an appropriate area for public
regulation; regulating public taste was simply none of the gov-
ernment's business. However, the fact was that people wanted
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some aesthetic regulations, particularly on signs. Now when
there is a collision between established legal doctrine and
strongly-felt public opinion, it is not hard to guess who normally
wins-the latter. Therefore, the law gave in on this point, and a
second period began. In this period, aesthetics was recognized as
an appropriate basis for public regulation of private property,
but only if associated with some more familiar and conventional
ground such as the protection of public safety. In Cusack, a clas-
sic case decided by the United States Supreme.Court in 1917,1"
regulation of billboards was therefore upheld, not on aesthetic
grounds, but as a matter of public safety. After all, a billboard
might blow over and hit someone; or criminals might hide be-
hind them, and the police would never think of looking there.
Moreover, all sorts of immoral activity might go on behind the
friendly shelter of a billboard. Such was the absurd legal fiction
which made up the law until relatively recently.
The third period has been characterized by two trends.
First, there has clearly been a strong movement toward fairly
full recognition of aesthetics as a ground for police-power action
quite as respectable as the more familiar grounds. Yet, at the
same time, most courts have held back a little, for the valid rea-
son that certain types of aesthetic regulation really are inher-
ently arbitrary-and it is the function of the courts to avoid ar-
bitrary regulation. And so, several intermediate rationales have
been developed.
The most obvious of these, involving the union of economics
and aesthetics, has come from the case law on historic districts.
If the preservation of aesthetic values also represents a substan-
tial local economic asset, for example by attracting tourists and
conventions to a city, aesthetic regulation has been widely up-
held on this basis. This was particularly important in the early
historic district cases in New Orleans in the 1940s, but has been
widely followed elsewhere.
The lowest common denominator test was enunciated in
Metuchen.12 Under this approach, there are many marginal is-
sues where aesthetic restrictions may be dubious because there
is room for legitimate differences of taste. On the other hand,
there are many areas of regulation where there is a clear consen-
sus; the junkyard in a residential area is an obvious example.
There is really no need to worry one's head about how to deal
19811
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with the difficult marginal cases in order to uphold regulation of
blatant aesthetic violations.
A second type of decisions involving landmark preservation
has until now (1978) almost totally been in New York. Most of
these legal problems have arisen under the clause in the New
York City Landmarks Preservation Law that provides less-fa-
vored treatment for applicants who are partially or wholly tax
exempt.13 These cases should not be generalized as indicating
disapproval of the landmark legislation as it affects fully tax-
paying organizations.
A third group of aesthetic-regulation cases, involving "look-
alike" or "look-different" restrictions on suburban sub-divisions,
involves a totally different type of situation. For example, Fox
Point, Wisconsin, prohibited, in an established area, any new
house that looked too different from those in the vicinity; and
this regulation was upheld in a resounding and quite silly opin-
ion by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.1 After that opinion came
down, Fox Point amended its ordinance to provide that a house
in a residential district must not: (a) look too different from, nor
(b) look too much like, its neighbors. For many years in class I
have asked someone to explain how to administer that ordi-
nance; no one has yet volunteered. It is a caricature of the kind
of public regulation which involves arbitrary whim and caprice.
However, the New York Court of Appeals has indicated its will-
ingness to accept this sort of regulation, 5 and so have several
other courts recently. Maybe we are in a period where anything
goes if it is silly enough.
Looking ahead, as to the taking issue, the outer limits of the
police power are now clearly farther away than they were a few
years ago. State courts have recently upheld some fairly extreme
regulations on ecologically sensitive land-restrictions which
would clearly have been invalidated previously. How much regu-
lation is permissible? During a major transition in the law, with
the states going in different directions, and with strongly oppos-
ing currents, predictions are uncertain. However, one situation is
clear: in certain areas, including the ecologically sensitive area,
the historic preservation area, and the amortization and noncon-
forming uses areas, municipalities should start making some ar-
rangements to pay partial compensation for some forms of regu-
lation. I agree with Professor John Costonis that we need an
[Vol. 1:619
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss3/11
ADDRESS
intermediate system, combining regulation of the police-power
with partial compensation.
Question 1. Can you give us some of your thoughts on Penn
Central?
Penn Central16 is not that big a change from long-standing
precedent. If it had gone the other way, this would have been a
revolutionary change-backwards.
Three or four important points were settled in this case.
First, the highest court in the land has now said that historic
preservation, and more specifically landmark preservation, is a
worthy goal for public action. That is going to have considerable
influence on other courts and on local action all over the
country.
Second, the majority of the Court seemed to be concerned
primarily with the problem raised in Judge Breitel's opinion,
whether the protection of one single landmark, as contrasted
with a large historic district, violated the general notion that one
justification for restrictions imposed by zoning is that these ap-
ply over a large area and so provide some reciprocal advantages
and disadvantages. Justice Brennan, for the majority, indicated
some concern about this, and Justice Rehnquist pressed it hard
in the dissent.17 However, the majority clearly held that this is
not a necessary basis for regulations.
The opinion also seemed clearly to reject the argument
made by Penn Central that a developer can split up the various
development rights involved in a piece of property, and then
claim that if any one of these is abolished, that is taking. 8
The Court also spoke favorably about the possibility of
transferring development rights (TDR), and held that this
should be taken into account in considering the effects of the
restriction on the value of Penn Central's holdings. It is reasona-
ble to assume that this holding will have considerable effect on
the attitude toward TDR in the lower courts.
Finally, and most importantly, the Court also reaffirmed the
basic principle in American land use law-what might be called
"the nation-wide rule"-that so long as a landowner can still ob-
tain some reasonable return from his land, land use restrictions
may substantially reduce the potential value of a developer's
land. This is hardly big news to anyone. In the Euclid case of
1926, fifty-two years ago, the effect of the restrictions was appar-
1981]
9
628 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:619
ently to cut three-fourths of the value of the land, and the court
majority couldn't have cared less. 19 Once the reasonable-return
rule was seriously challenged in Penn Central, it was important
to have the Court reaffirm it clearly: a landowner has a constitu-
tional right to some reasonable return from his land, though not
necessarily to a higher return, if he can think of a more intensive
use. If the Court had repudiated this, that would have reversed
the whole trend of American land use law for the last fifty
years. 0 It is hardly surprising that Justice Rehnquist wanted to
do so; it was more surprising that Justice Stevens (normally the
Court's most perceptive member on these questions) appeared
to agree to this.
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5. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
6. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40C, § 3 (West 1979).
Historic Preservation Law and Advocacy
PAUL SPENCER BYARD
* LL.B., 1966, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1961, Yale College; President, National
Center for Preservation Law; Legal Counsel, James Stewart Polshek & Associates.
1. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
2. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (Williams
1976 & Supp. 1981) (enacted pursuant to N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1977)).
3. This local group was founded in the 1890's by a distinguished architect to pay
attention to the fabric of the city. By its agitation, it was responsible for the first zoning
ordinance in New York City.
4. The New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission was established pursu-
ant to NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER ANN. § 534 (Williams 1976).
5. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 23, 1975, at 16, col. 3
(Sup. Ct. New York County).
6. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (lot
Dep't 1975).
7. Id. at 271, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
8. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397
N.Y.S. 2d 914 (1977).
9. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 121 n. 23 (1978).
10. 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (dictum) ("The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive .... The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well
as monetary"). Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
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NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR.
* LL.B., 1943, Yale Law School; B.A., 1938, Yale University; currently Professor of
Law, Vermont Law School.
1. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
2. Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77 (1899), afl'd, 188 U.S.
491 (1903).
3. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
4. See, e.g., Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
5. Seven in the Northeast (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland); three in the Midwest (Ohio, Michigan, and
Illinois); plus Florida, Texas, and California.
6. For most of this period, all the states adopted the same standard enabling act
with only minor variations. This does not seem to have had much influence on the
situation.
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7. The clearest example of this is in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974). Mr. Justice Douglas cited only Supreme Court opinions (which is to say few zon-
ing cases more recent than 1928) as if nothing had happened in the field during the
intervening period.
8. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROBS. 317 (1955).
10. E.g., Coalition for Los Angeles County Planning in the Public Interest v. Board
of Supervisors, 76 Cal. App. 3d 241, 142 Cal. Rptr. 766 (Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Baker v.
City of Milwaukie, 271 Or. 500, 533 P.2d 772 (1975); Fasano v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Raabe v. City of Walker, 383 Mich. 165, 174
N.W.2d 789 (1970); Fallon v. Baker, 455 S.W.2d 572 (Ky. 1970); Dalton v. City and
County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 400, 462 P.2d 199 (1969). For earlier illustrations of the
same attitude, see Fritts v. City of Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1969); Newark Milk
and Cream Co. v. Township of Parsippany, 47 N.J. Super. 306, 135 A.2d 682 (Law Div.
1957).
11. Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917). Note that this case
came a decade before Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
12. United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447
(1964).
13. See, e.g., Society for Ethical Culture in the City of New York v. Spatt, 68 A.D.2d
112, 416 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1st Dep't 1979), af'd, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434
N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366
N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), all'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Lutheran Church in
America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974);
Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 35 Misc. 2d 933, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct.
New York County 1967), rev'd, 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1st Dep't 1968). See
also Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n, 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d
848 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1966).
14. State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d
217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955). Fox Point is a wealthy suburb of Milwaukee.
15. See, e.g., Old Farm Road v. Town of New Castle, 26 N.Y.2d 462, 259 N.E.2d 920,
311 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1970).
16. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 133-35.
17. Id. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In the preparation of the National Trust's
brief, on which I helped, we considered whether this argument should be spelled out at
length. The decision was to omit any detailed argument along those lines. It did not
seem to be a central point, and I agreed thoroughly with the decision not to put it in the
brief. Yet that decision was a mistake. The obvious argument would have been easy to
spell out, on the basis of well-established state law on the comprehensive plan require-
ment: the courts have previously recognized, as representative of a "comprehensive
plan," arrangements quite analogous to those involved in the New York City landmarks
law. (See, for example, my American Land Planning Law, v. 1, §§ 26.01-06 (1977)). The
court did not have that documentation in the brief before them; nor did they discover it
on their own. So the court simply had to answer that the regulation was all right.
18. One would have thought that Euclid settled that point: clearly the Court there
upheld the complete abolition (as to various tracts involved) of the development rights
for industry, commerce, and multiple dwellings. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
19. Compare Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) with
Hadacheck v. Sebastion, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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20. This is unquestionably the rule in almost all other states, although it is not the
rule prevailing in Illinois (it is the minority rule there). It was also briefly abandoned in
New York during the Keating period. In the late sixties, Judge Keating led the Court of
Appeals in a strong swing back toward a pro-developer position. The New York Court of
Appeals has gradually recovered from that temporary right-wing deviation; the Keating
law on land use is clearly no longer followed in New York, although it continues to gener-
ate a lot of confusion.
Aesthetics As A Basis For Regulation
DANIEL RIESEL
* LL.B., 1961, Columbia Law School; Partner, Winer, Neuberger, and Sive, New
York City. Member of the Environmental Law Committee, Association of the Bar of the
City of New York. General Counsel and member, Board of Directors, Hudson River
Scoop, Inc.; Lecturer on environmental law.
1. 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 14.01 (4th ed. 1978).
2. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dis-
missed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
3. Id. at 467, 191 N.E.2d at 275, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
4. Id. (quoting Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 218, 231 (1955)).
5. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
6. 1 R. ANDERSON, NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.16 (2d ed. 1973).
7. Id.
8. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. de-
nied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
9. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
10. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW § 3-0301(2)(d)(4) (McKinney 1973).
11. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d at 624.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 616.
14. Id. at 612.
15. 1966 N.Y. Laws ch. 828.
16. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
17. Id. at 416.
18. Department of Transportation Act of 1966, § 4f, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976).
19. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979).
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